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Carl  Menger  is  best  known  as  the  codiscoverer  of  marginalisn
and  the  founder  of  the  Austrian  School.  In  the  last  fifteen
years,  there  has  been  a  renaissance  of  interest  in  Mengerrs
work.  Some of  this  interest  was  stir[ulated  bv  the  centennia!-  of
1
the  rtMarginalist  Revolution.?r  Coincidental  with  this  general-
interest  in  the  Marginalists,  the  revival  of  the  Austrian  School
has generated  specific  interest  i.n Menger.  The nodern  Austfians
have focused  chiefly  on Mengerts  nethodological  views,  especial-Ly
his  early  statement  of  methodologlcal  individualisrn.  In  this
essay,  I  exarnine Mengerts  theory  of  noney,  which  is  less  well
known  than  his  nethodological  work.  As  I  argue  be1ow,  however,
Mengerts  theory  of  money  is  at  least  as  inportant  as  his
nethodology.  Recent  work  in  the  m  i c  r o  f o  u  n  d  a  L  i o  n  s  of  monetary
theory  hightens  the  relevance  of  Menger's  analysis  of  money.'  ,o.
instance,  the  recent  controversy  over  the  legal  restrictions
theory  of  rnoney should  provide  us  with  renewed  appreciation  for
Mengerts  approach,  which  constitutes  an  alternative  explanataon
of  the  demand for  noninterest-bearing  liabilities  of  the  federal
governrnent.  Since  Mengerrs  theoretical  and  methodoloeical  work
-1-are  Ehe foundation  of  his  nonetary  analysis,  I  review  these  in
the  next. section.  After  that,  I  examine Mengerrs  theory  of  the
origin  and developnent  of  a medium of  exchange.  I  then  contrast
his  theory  with  the  1egal  restrictions  theory.  I  conclude  with
an assessment of  the  Mengerian  contribution  to  monetary  theory.
MICRO  ANALYSIS
I  interpret  the  rrMarginat  Revolutiontt  as  a  microecononic  revolt
against  Ricardian  Economics.  The  differences  anong  the  early
participants  lrere  important.  As  Mark  Blaug  observed,  the
Marginal  Revolution  took  three  distinctive  forms:  I'the  marginal
uEili.ty  revolution  in  England  and  America,  the  subJectivist
revolution  in  Austria,  and  the  general  equilibriurn  revolution  in
tL
Switzerland  and  Italy."  To  treat  the  three  approaches  as  one
would  be  to  gloss  over  important  differences,  obscuring  the
.l
distinctiveness  of  each  contribution.  Nonethless,  there  is  a
nicroeconomic  thread  running  through  the  work  of  the  three  great
narginalists.
As  a  general  microecononic  revolution,  the  work  of  Jevons,
Menger  and  Walras  was  never  brought  to  fruition.  Large  areas
-2-were  effectively  ceded  to  an  older  way  of  thinking,  with  nost
orthodox  econonists  accepting  the  nicro  -  macfo  divis  j-on as
natural,  dictated  by  the  phenomena.  The  acceptance  of  a  nacro
realn  of  Lhinking  in  orthodox  econonics  goes  against  the  spiri!
of  the  1870's,  the  spirit  that  accounts  for  whatever  homogeneity
exists  i.n  the  work  of  the  t.hree  great  figures  discussed.
Menger  shares  with  Jevons  and  l{alras  the  fate  of  having  had  his
contribution  diluted,  as  it  were.  Nonetheless,  one  cou1.d say
that  the  microeconomic  content  of  modern  economics  is  the  joint
outcome  of  the  work  of  a1l- three.  I  now  turn,  houever,  to
Mengerts  distinctive  contribution.  What  is  most  distincti-ve
about  Menger  is  that  which  has  been  least  absorbed  into  orthodo).
economics.
Subjectivism
Methodological  subjectivisn  is  the  specifically  Mengerian  or
Austrian  contribution  to  economics.  Although  Mengerts  concern
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with  disequilibrium  economj-cs has  recently  been  emphasized,  the
connection  betrveen his  subjectivism  and  his  emphasis  on  change
and  the  econonic  process  --  a  constant  state  of  disequilibrium  --
is  not  generally  made.
A subjectivist  analyzes  all  economic  events  in  terrns  of  agents r
perceptions  of  these  events:  a  thing  is  a  good,  for  example,
because  individuals  believe  it  to  be  a  good.  They  make decisions
-3-because  of  their  respective  beliefs  about  the  relevant  state  of
the  world,  11[  because  of  the  actual  or  objective  staEe  of  the
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world  as  seen  by  the  economist  posing  as  ideal  observer.  Menger
held  thaf  "there  is  not  a  phenornenon of  the  real  world  rvhich  does
not  offer  us  the  spectacle  of  constant  change,rr  a  view
inconsistent  with  naking  perfect  knowledge  constructs  the  central
focus  of  economics.  The  perfect  knowledge  assumption  is
a  n  t i s  u  b  j e  c  t i v  i s  t  because  it  lmplies  that,  despite  the
pervasiveness  of  change,  transactors  have  already  acquired  al1
relevant  information.  The  assumption  leads  to  the  conclusion
that  perceptions  always  correspond  to  reality,  eliminating
genuine  informational  problerns  fron  econornic  anaJ-ysi.s.  Since
perfect  knowledge  is  the  def ini.ng  characteristic  of  equilibriun,
an  economics  in  which  uncertainty  is  central  is  i.nherently  an
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econonics  of  d  i s  e  q  u  i 1  i b  r i u  rn  ,  the  narket  process  and  change.  The
emphasis  on  subjectivism,  change  and  disequilibriurn  goes  far
toward  explaining  why  economists  who  followed  Mengerts  lead  have
felt  uneasy  with  modern  neoclassicaL  econonics.
It  is  standard  to  suggest  that  demand is  the  subjective  element
in  price  determination,  while  cost  is  the  objective  elenent.  The
view  that  subjectivism  applies  to  tastes  or  the  dernand side  of
price  determinatioo,  while  objective  factors  are  relevant  to  the
cost  or  supply  side,  is  incornpatible  with  Menger I  s  analysis.
This  point  can  best  be  seen  by  quoLing  hlieser,  who applied
-4-10
Menger I  s  analysi-s  to  cost  theory.
Between  costs  and  utility  there  is  no  fundanental
oppositlon.  Costs  are  goods  valued,  i.n  the  individual
case,  according  to  thelr  general  utility.  The
opposition  beLween costs  and  utiliEy  is  only  that
between  the  utility  of  the  individual  case,  and  utility
on  the  who1e.  I{hoever  thinks  of  rutilitvr  without
thinking  of  rcost,  t  sinpLy  neglects,  in  the  utility  of
one  production,  the  utility  of  the  others.  And whoever
produces,  in  the  individual  case,  at  least  cost,
produces,  on  the  who1e,  with  the  hi.ghest  utility,
inasnuch  as  he  thus  saves  all  the  opportunity  of
utility  possible,  and  consequently  in  the  long  run
utilizes  all  the  opportunities  to  the  utmost  possible.
Thus  when  the  law  of  costs  obtains,  utility  remains
the  source  of  ya1ue.  More  than  this,  marginal  utility
renains  the  aeasure  of  value.
Nonetheless,  in  his  fanous  scissors  analogy,  Marshall
criticized  the  Austrians  for  treatlng  utility  alone  as  the  source
of  value  or  explanation  of  price. In  arguing  that  the  Austriansr
focus  on  utility  emphasized  too  much the  demand side,  MarshalL
misconstrued  their  position. Schumpeter  '  s  criticisn  of  Marshall
on  this  issue  r+as exacLly  to  the  point.
They  (the  AusErians)  stood  in  no  need  of  bei.ng  told
about  the  two  blades  of  Marshall's  pair  of  scissors.
What  Lhey  ained  at  showing  was  that  L9![  bl-ades  consist
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of  the  same material  --  that  both  dernand and  supply  (no
matter  whether  the  case  i-s  one  of  exchanging  exiscing
commodities  or  of  producing  them)  nay  be  explained  in
tprn<  nf  I'rt_i1i+-  I
I2
Schumpeter  further  observed  that:
. . .The  marginal  uLility  pri.nciple  applies  to  the
demand and  supply  sides  of  the  value  problem  in  anv
case,  both  in  the  long  run  and  in  the  short  run.  Co"t
of  production  is  not  an  independent  principl-e  taking
charge  in  the  long  run.  But  the  marginal  utility
principle,  acting  upon  the  data  of  the  situation,  will
-5-in  the  long  run  (granting  a  nunber  of  assurnptions)  so
operate  as  Eo equate  exchange value  to  cosEs.
Nevertheless,  neolcassical  econonists  have  generally  accepted
Marshallrs  synthesis  of  subjectivist  dernand theory  and  objec!ive
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cost  theory,  The question  is  not  one of  relative  importance of
two  types  of  factors,  rrsub  jectivett  and  ttob  jectivet',  but  one  of
consisLency  in  approach.  Since  the  subjectivist  is  concerned
wi!h  otherst  perceptions  under  unceriainty,  all  relevant  econonic
!0agnitudes  are  'lsubjective.  r  If  a'rfactr'  (be  it  a  technologi-ca1
relation  or  other  condition)  does  not  affect  perceptions'  it  is
not  econor[ica11y  relevant.
It  musL be  emphasized  that  Menger,  though  a  nethodological
subjectivist,  was  no  epistemological  subjectivist.  That  is,  he
did  noE  deny  that  there  is  an  objecEive  reality  independent  of
individualsr  knowledge  of  it.  Being  an  Aristotel-ian,  Menger
affirmed  the  existence  of  this  reality,  as  well  as  our  ability  to
apprehend  it.  But  our  knowledge  of  reality  is  imperfect  at  each
moment,  even  as  lt  is  being  perfected.  Menger  was  thus  1ed  to  a
subjectivist  methodology,  which  emphasizes  Ehe incompleteness  of
74
knowledge  pervading  every  rnarket  transaction.
There  is  one  more  najor  eLement  to  be  fitted  into  our  picture
of  the  Mengerian  approach.  Having  done  that,  I  can  then  develop
Mengerrs  theory  of  rnoney.  In  the  next  section,  then,  T  develop
Menger's  approach  to  lnstitutional  analysis.
-6-Undesigned  Social  Institutions
As  indicated  above,  subjectvists  enphasize  uncertainLy  and
disequilibrium.  This  emphasis  naturally  directs  oners  attention
to  how individuals  acquire  and  disserninate  information,  an
inqui,ry  that  alnost  inevitably  leads  Eo a  theory  of
institutions.  InsEitutions  play  a  cruciaL  role  in  the
production,  disseroi-nation  and  use  of  information  i-n society.
This  viewpoint,  which  derives  f rorn Menger,  was  fu11y  developed  in
Ilayekrs  analysis  of  the  price  system  and  in  Misest  and  Hayekrs
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work  on  econonic  calculation.  The  conparatively  short  shrift
given  to  institutions  i.n  neoclassical  economics  is,  at  least  in
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part,  an  effect  of  its  not  having  incorporated  subjectivism.
Menger  began  his  anaJ-ysis  of  Ehe  evolution  of  social
instiEutions  with  the  f ollor+ing  question:  "Ig.g  can  it  be  that  the
institutions  which  serve  the  conmon welfare  and  are  extremely
sienificant  for  its  develoDnent  cone  into  being  without  a  conmon
L7
will  direcred  toward  establishinq  gLd.r'  As  he  noted:  'rThe
solution  of  the  nost  irnportant  problens  of  the  theoretical  sociaL
sciences  in  general  and  of  theoretical  economics  in  particular  is
thus  closely  connected  with  the  quesEion  of  theoretically
understanding  the  origin  and  change  of  I  organi-ca11y t  created
l8
social  structures."  At  the  end  of  the  book  in  which  he  takes  up
"organic{  institutions,  Menger  explici-t1y  sets  down what  he
.|beiieved  the proper  method  to be to address  the problem-:19
l/e  already  alluded  to  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of
the  phenornena of  economy which  cannot  usually  be  viewed
as  I  organically  I  created  I  social  structures,  i  e.g.,
market  prices,  wages,  interest  rates,  etc.,  have  come
into  exi.stence  in  exactly  the  same way  as  those  social
insEitutions  which  we nentioned  in  the  preceding
section.  For  they,  too,  as  a  rule  are  not  the  result
of  socially  teLelogical  causes,  but  the  uninEended
result  of  innurnerable  efforts  of  economic  subiects
pursuing  individual  interests.  The  theoreticil
un d  e  r s tanE i n  g--T-Tt-ern,  t he  t he o  r e  t i c  a  1  un d  e  r s  L  and i n g  o  f
thei.r  nature  and  their  movement  can  thus  be  attained  in
an  exact  nanner  only  in  the  same way  as  the
understanding  of  the  abovernentioned  social
institutions.  That  is,  it  can  be  attai.ned  by  reducing
then  to  their  elements.  to  the  individual  factors  of
their  causation,  and by invesrifiEii-f,-ilE  laws by which
the  complicaEed  phenomena of  hunan  economy under
discussion  here  are  built  up  from  these  elements.
This  is  \,/haL  Menger  elsewhere  referred  to  as  the  'iconpositive"
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nethod.  In  advocating  that  the  actual,  conplex  s!ructures  be
built  up  from  their  indi.vidual  e16hents,  Menger  articulated  the
case  for  rnethodological  individualism.  In  characterizing  social
institutions  as  the  results  not  of  hurnan design  ("not  the  result
of  socially  telelogical  causes"),  but  of  hunan  actions  (rrthe
unintended  result  of innurnerable  efforts  of  economic subjects
interestsr'),  Menger reminded  the  reader  of
analysis  of  the  forces  producing
pursuing  individual
the  need for  causal
insti  !utional  change,
Menger's  emphasis  on  the  crucial  inportance  playecl  by
undesigned  institutions  differentiates  his  theory  f rom
contenporary  econornic  thinking,  which  increasingly  sees  every
economj.c problem  as  amenable  to  optimal  control  analysi,s.  Arnong
-8-modern  Austrians,  Hayek  has  followed  Menger  nost  closely  here  by
2L
focusing  on  the  analysis  of  undesigned  social  insitu!ions.
Throughout  his  work,  Menger  used  this  cornpositive  method.  In
focusing  on  the  evolution  of  social  institutions,  he  remained
closer  to  classical  political  econony  than  his  contemporaries  and
their  intellectual  descendan!s.  But  while  he  shared  the
classical  concern  lrith  1egal,  political  and  economic
institutions,  he  rejected  the  nacroecononic  approach  to  these
questions.  Menger's  use  of  his  i.  n  d  i v  i d  u  a  1  i s  t i c  ,  compositive
method  in  monetary  econonics  produced  one  of  his  most  significant
applications:  a  theory  of  the  evolution  of  money.  Almost  alone
arnong Mengerrs  interpreters,  Ilayek  perceived  fhe  link  between  his
general  approach  to  econonics  and  Lhe  subsLance  of  his  monetary
economics:  rrthe  consistent  application  to  the  theory  of  noney  of
the  peculiar  subjective  or  individualistic  approach  which,
indeed,  underlies  the  narginal  utility  analysis,  but  which  has  a
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much wider  and  nore  universal  siAnificance.rl
-9-THE  THEORY  OF MONEY
It  is  now recognized  tha!  general  equilibrium  theory  does not
incorporate  noney as  a  distinctive  good with  uni.que properties.
In  general  equilibrium  models,  money is  merely  a  nurn5raire.  The
num6raire  has no properties  distinguishing  it  in  principle  from
the- "nonnoney  goods in  the  node1.  Models in  which  money is
nerely  the  nurn6raire  good are  barter  nodels  in  disguise.  In
addition,  the  rrnoneytt  in  such constructs  is  inevitably  neutraL  in






Link"d  rvith  these  failings  of  contemporary  general
models  is  their  inabilitv  to  exDlain  "how...certai.n
cone  Eo be  exalted  in  the  qeneral  media  of
Menger  solved  the  latter  problem  and  avoided  Ehe
These  successes  aLone  comnend his  analysis  to  nodern
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theorists,  who,  however,  are  largely  unaware  of  iE,
Menger  sunmarized  the  process  of  t.he evolution  of  a  monetary
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unit  in  the  following  way:
As each economi-zing individual  becones increasingly
tnore  Eifi.  of  his  economic j.nterest,  he  is  fed  by  inls
interest.  without  anv agreement.  without  legislative
cornpulsion  and  even  .rithout  regard 'rithout  regard  to  the  public
;T6'*"t,  uo g:.G-iri6-Zoiil5'aiFfEi-:.n  eicnaffi-Ti'.
other,  more  saleable,  comrnodities,  even  if  he  does  noEneed  them  for  any  immediate  consumption  purpose.  With
economic  progress,  therefore,  we can  everywhere  observe
the  phenonenon  of  a  certain  number  of  goods,  especially
those  thaE  are  most  easily  saleable  at  a  given  time  and
p1ace,  becoming,  under  the  powerful  influence  of
custom,  acceptable  to  everyone  in  trade,  and  thus
capabl-e  of  being  given  in  exchange  for  any  other
commodity.  These  goods  were  caLLed  rrGeldrr by  our
ancestors,  a  term  derived  from  ttseltenrt  which  means to
corpensaEe  or  pay,  Hence  the  t eiE-n@]!"  in  our
language  designates  the  means of  payi'EiT  as  such.
In  an  analysis  reminiscent  of  Adan  Smithrs  invisible  hand
reasoning,  Menger  treated  money's  evolution  as  the  unintendec
consequence  of  individuals  pursuing  their  own self-interest.
Indeed,  there  is  some sinilarity  be!ween
the  hypothetical
theorists  of  the
history  of  Smith  and  the
Menger  I  s  theorizing  and
oEher Scottish  social
Menger  t  s  consisten!  use eighteenth  century.  But
of  the  compositive  method  enabled  hirn to  go  further  in  this  and
other  applications  than  had  any  who went  before  and  nost  r^rho  came
after  him .
In  the  Principles,  nThe Theory  of  Moneyt'  follows  the  rrTheory  of
the  Comrnodity.I'  Menger  built  his  nonetary  analysis  upon  his  more
general  analysis  of  holding  stocks  of  goods.  An  economy
progresses  fron  econonic  s  e  I f - s  u  f f i c  i e  n  c  y  ,  !o  production  for  the
narket  on  order,  to  production  for  the  market  on  speculation.
Concomitant  with  this  developrnent  is  the  increasing  holding  of
stocks  of  unfinished  and  partl"y  finished  commodities,  and,  in  the
final  evolutionary  stage,  stocks  of  finished  comnodities.  In
this  context,  commodi.ties  are  stocks  of  goods  intended  for  sale,
a  relationship  that  is  not  ?rinherenL  in  a  good,  no  property  of
11it,  but  roerely  a  specific  relationship  of  a  good  to  the  person
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who  has  command of  it.il
0nce  they  begin  holding  cornmodity  sEocks,  wealth  ordners are
necessarily  inLerested  in  the  rnarketability  (absatzfahigkeit)  or
saleability  of  these  stocks.  Mengerrs  analysis  of  this  problen
treats  questions  on  1y  recently  rediscovered  in  the
transactj-ons-costs  literature.  Menger  observed  that  though  a
commodiLy  is  for  sale,  rrit  is  not  intended  for  sale
t6
llnconditionallv.rt  The  stockholder  is  not  i.nterested  in  the  most
rapid  possible  sale  of  the  entire  stock,  regardless  of  price.
Thus,  "nerchants  nay  ...  be  jusLified  if  they  compla  j-n of
sluggish  sa1es,  since  a1!hough  their  commodities  are  intended  for
sale  ...  they  are  intended  for  sa1e,  not  aL  any  price,  but  at
29
pri-ces that  correspond to  the egeral  econornic  situalion.  tr
The  rtgeneral  economic  situationrt  is  a  subjective  category,
dif  f  eri.ng  for  different  holders  of  stocks.  Roughly,  Menger
attempted  to  get  at  a  neasure  of  the  relative  costliness  of
disposing  of  a  unit,  or  the  whole  supply  of  a  conmodity,  aL  the
price  that  r,Jould obtain  r{rere the  seller  in  active  communication
with  polential  buyers.  Mengerrs  analysis  is  not  ent j-re1y  foreign
to  the  idea  of  a  rrperf ect  market,"  but  neither  is  it  a  crude
approxinaEion  of  that  idea.  He dealt  with  the  Drocess  of  trade
and  the  evaluation  of  market.s,  not  vrith  some hypothetlcal  end
-72-point.  Moreover,  in  being  concerned  with  the  narketability  of
vari.ous  commodities,  he  was  --  to  force  his  anlaysis  into  sLatic
terns  --  concerned  with  1  e  s  s  - t h  a  n  - p  e  r f e  c  t  markets  that  are
becoming  more  perfect.
In  Menger's  analysis,  traders  discover  that  sone  commodities
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are  particularLy  marketable  and  widely  acceptable.  1n  other
words,  these  commodities  can  be  quickly  disposed  of  at  low
transaction  costs.  Transactors  eventually  discover  that  certain
commodities  are  more  narkeLable  while  others  are  less  so.  over
tine,  they  become increasingly  r,ri11ing  to  invest  their  weaLth  i.n
the  nore  marketable  cornrnodities.  Indeed,  individuals  learn  Eo
accept  certain  conmodiLies  In  exchange  simply  because  they  are
marketable,  and  not  necessarily  because  they  thernselves  have  any
final  denand  for  them.  Th6  process  is  self-reinforciog.  As  more
traders  wi11ing1y  accept  saleable  conrroditi.es  in  trade,  their
31
acceptabiliEy  to  prospective  traders  increases.
This  historical  process  rnarks  the  evolution  of  a  medium of
exchange.  As  the  process  continues,  a  parti-cu1ar  good  will
ordinarily  become the  cornmon  medium of  exchange  --  money..
Historically,  go  1d  and  silver  have  generally  been  Lhose  goods.
Demand for  gold  and  silver  is  relat.ively  great  and  widely
dispersed,  while  supply  is  relatively  srnall.  In  other  words,
gold  and  silver  are  both  relatively  valuable  and  highly
marketable.
't!Mengerts  analysis  dealt  with  the  outcome  of  many individuals
pursuing  their  self-inEerest,  which  in  this  instance,  consisEed
of  a  desire  for  liquiditv.  Since  Keynes,  monetary  Lheorists  have
emphasized  the  irnportance  of  liquidity.  In  his  rescateroent  of
Keynes'  views,  Sir  John  Hicks  treated  liquiditv  as  flexibilitv:
rr...  Liquidity  is  not  a  property  of  a  single  choice;  it  is  a
natter  of  a  sequence  of  choice,  a  related  sequence.  It  is
concerned  r,rith  the  passage  f rox0 the  known  to  the  unknor,rn  --  lrit.h
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the  knowledge  that  if  we waiE  we can  have  more  knowledge.rr  Sir
John's  liquidity  concept  is  basically  Mengerrs.  Above  all  e1se,
liquidity  gives  the  economic  agen!,  be  he  craftsman,  nerchant,
trader  or  consumer,  flexibiJ.ity.  Tn  vastly  reducing  the  costs  of
specialized  production,  trade  and  stockholding,  hi.ghly  liquid
commodities  greatly  facilitate  economic  progress.  The  evolulion
of  a  connon  medium of  exchange  is  surely  crucial  to  the
development  of  a  cornplex  econonic  order.
Modern  nonetary  theorisLs  have  long  grappLed  with  Mengerrs
problem.  Until  recently,  litt.le  progress  was made in  analyzing
the  process  by  which  a  noney  good  came into  existence,  Most
models  inpl-icitly  assumed noney  was  invented  in  sone  sense,
despite  the  fact  that  over  100  years  ago  Menger  realized  that
"money  is  not  the  product  of  an  agreenent  on  the  part  of
economizj-ng  nan,  not  the  producE  of  legislative  acts.  No  one
5J
invented  it.rr  Of  much of  the  recent  literature,  Professor  Jones
-14-renarked  that:  rrAlLhough  these  works  illuminate  how noney  rnight
overcome  logistical  difficul-ties  of  reaching  an  ef f icient
allocation  with  decenEralized  exchange,  they  offer  no  suggestions
of  how a  monetary  pattern  of  trade  coul-d  evolve  without  a
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centralized  decision.tr  Though  Jones  hirnself  recognized  Mengerrs
pioneering  work,  he  rvas unable  to  solve  the  problen  of
sinultaneously  determining  the  rnoney good  and  its  markeL  va1ue.
Yet  Menger  had  done  this  in  the  Principles  and  1n  rrGeldrt.  Since
what  becones  noney  was  originally  the  mosL narketable  goocl  ,  it
always  had  an  exchange  value.  Its  very  marketability  enhanced
the  demand for  it  over  and  above  its  use  va1ue.  The  addition  of
a  denand  for  this  good  as  a  nedium  6f  sachanoa  i^  ir-<
rrnonmonetaryrr demand.  causes  it.s  relative  price  to  rise  over
time.
There  is,  however,  no  unique  point  at  which  a  good  becomes
noney.  Hence,  there  is  no  logical  or  historical  break  in  the
sequence  of  its  price  history.  One dayrs  prices  built  upon
yesterdayrs,  together  with  agentsr  expectations  of  future  price
movernents,  in  a  way  not  differing  in  kind  for  any  other  good.  If
anything,  the  goodrs  high  narkeLability  made this  process  nore
certain  lhan  for  the  average  good.
Menger analyzed  rnoney  as  a  connodity  in  order  to  explain
theoretically  its  historical  evolution.  The modern system of
pure  f  i.duciary  noney postdates,  of  course,  Mengerrs  theory.  This
-  t5 -systen  has  devel-oped  partly  by  evolution  and  partly  by  governtnent
intervention.  In  a  sense,  Menger  anticipated  or  at  least  allowed
for  Lhis  developnent  when he  observed  that.  'rt.he 1ega1  order
usually  has  an  influence  on  the  rnoney-character  of  commoditles
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which,  though  sma11, cannot  be denied."  Mises  exlended  Mengerrs
analysi.s  to  nodern  nonetary  systems  by  examining  the  possibility
.1O
of  governnentrs  making  coins  or  notes  rnoney by  trf  iatn.
All  thaL  the  State  can  do  by  means of  its  of f j.cia1
stamp  is  to  single  out  certain  pieces  of  metal  or  paper
f rorn all  the  other  things  of  the  same kind  so  that  they
can  be  subjected  to  a  process  of  valuation  independent
of  that  of  the  rest.  Thus  it  permits  those  objects
possessing  the  special  legal  qualification  to  be  used
as  a  comnon nediurn  of  exchange  while  the  other
conmodities  of  the  sane  sort  renain  mere  comnodities.
It  can  also  take  various  steps  \,rith  the  object  of
encouraging  actual  enployment  of  the  qualified
conmodities  as  comnon media  of  exchange.  But  Lhese
comnodities  can  never  become money  just  because  the
State  commands it;  money can  be  created  only  by  the
usage  of  those  L'ho take  part  in  commercial
transactions.
We can  now assess  the  particular  contributions  of  Menger  to
nonetary  economics.  First,  he  solved  Lhe  problem  of  the
evolution  of  a  cornmon  nediun  of  exchange.  He  did  so  by  applying
his  compositive  method,  which  consisted  of  a  thoroughgoing
subjectivism.  Jonesr  renarks  about  his  own rnodel  apply  wlth
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equal  force  to  Menger:
,..The  approach  suggests  that  a  very  comrnon  good
would  emerge  as  a  fi-rst  comnodity  money  in  a  barter
economy.  The  important  point  is  that  this  comnonness
is  a  market  characteristic  of  goods  rather  than  an
intrinsic  phy  sical  characteristic  such  as  portability,
-  16 -divisibility,  or  cognizability.  This  i.s  not  to  say
that  such  physical  characteristics  play  no  role  in
determining  r+hich  good  will  be  used  as  a  rnedium of
exchange.  H6TE?6r-the  analysis  suggesrs  rhar  rhe
ralionale  for  using  a  mediurn of  exchange  Ln  the  first
place  mi.ght  be  found  in  the  di.f  f ering  market
characteristics  of  the  good  and  the  decentralized
iature  of  exchanse.
In  the  previous  passage,  Jcnes  presented  a  subjectivist
vielarpoint  on  what  constitutes  a  sound  theoretical  treatnent  of
the  origin  of  noney  or  any  other  econornic  institution.  physical
characteristics  or  objective  conditions  pLay  a  ro le  in  the
evolution  of  organic  social  institutions.  Ennurnerating  such
characteristics  or  conditions  does  not  constitute,  however,  an
explanation  or  analysis  of  the  evolutionary  process.  Relating
these  characteristics  and  conditions  to  self-interesLed  behavior
of  individuals  can  forn  the  basis  of  an  evolutionary  economic
analysis.  To  paraphrase  Jones,  the  economi.st  must  account  for
the  way  1n  which  physical  characteristics  of  things  becorne rnarket
characteristic  of  goods.  Menger  accomplished  this  in  his  theory
of  money  by  relating  physical  characterisEics  Co narketabiliry,
Mengerts  money is  much rnore than  a  nu106raire  or  otherwise
neutral  econonic  institution.  rt  is  one  of  the  driving  forces  of
econonic  development,  replete  \^'ith  real  effects.  The  distincti.ve
properEy  of  the  rooney good  is  that,  being  Lhe  most  rnarketable  of
all  goods,  it  has  evolved  into  a  comnon medium of  exchange.
Nearly  al-1 transactions  are  executed  with  the  use  of  money,  so
noney  is  the  most  Iiquid  of  aIl  goods.  It  is  "for  sale"  in  everv
market..Though  sti11  largely  unfarniliar  to  contemporary  noentary
econonists,  Mengerrs  theory  of  noney  has  gained  sorne exposure
lndirectly  through  the  work  of  Georg  Sirnnel.  Frankel  has
contrasted  Sinmelts  vlew  of  money as  an  evclved  social
institution  with  the  "nnonetary  noninalisnrr  of  Georg  Friedrich
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Knapp  and  John  Maynard  Keynes.  Monetary  nominalists  contend
that  noney  is  a  consci.ous  creation  of  the  state,  which  can,
39
moreover,  be  altered  as  the  state  pLeases.
Frankel  broughL  out  the  correspondence  between  Sinmelrs  views
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on  money and  those  of  Menger.  In  a  review  article,  Laidl-er  and
Rowe correctly  emphasized  the  intellectual  nrecedence  of
4I
Menger.  Sinrnel,  the  sociologis!,  apparently  drew  on  Mengerrs
theory  of  money in  developing  his  sociology  of  rnoney.  As
inportant  and  deserving  of  econonistrs  attention  as  Simmelrs  work
is,  Mengerrs  is  Lhe  source  of  the  economic  analysis  of  the  origin
of  money.
In  the  next  section,  I  utilize  Mengerrs  insights  to  analyze  a
contemporary  monetary  debate.  In  the  process,  I  try  to
illuninate  further  Menger  I  s  contribution,
-  18 -42
I'lhy  Mo  ney ?
The  simultaneous  existence  of  noninterest-bearing  fiat  money
and  I n  t e  r e  s  t - b  e  a  r i n  g  governnent  debt  presents  an  a  p  par ent
paradox.  The  two  assets  are  obligations  of  the  sarne issuer,  yer
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bear  very  different  rates  of  return.  In  a  classic  articLe,
Tobin  wrote  of  rrthe  apparent  irrationality  of  hoLding  cash"  and
posed  the  question:  rWhy  should  anyone  hold  non-interest  bearing
obligations  of  the  governnent  instead  of  interest  bearlng
44
cbligations.  rl
Many have  argued  that,  indeed,  in  a  stationary  staLe,  there
would  be  no  demand for  money.  SEationarity  implies  certainty  of
paynents  and  receipts,  including  certainty  of  timing.
Individuals  could  then  bridge  payments  gaps  through  the  purchase
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and  sa  1e  of  liquid  financial  assets.
Along  with  a  stochastic  elenent  to  payments  and  receipt.s,
transaction  costs  nust  be  added  to  neoclassical  rnodels  in  order
to  generate  a  demand for  money.  Uncertai-nty  is  needecl t.o
generate  a  precau!ionary  demand.  Transaction  costs  in  the  forn
of  brokerage  fees  are  needed  to  insure  tha!  the  precautj.onary
_ 19 _demand is  for  money and  not  for  interest-bearing  liabilities  of
the  government  (  bonds  ) .
There  are  two problerns with  this  orthodox  approach.  First,  the
uncerLainty  of  these  neolclassical  models is  severely  li.rnited,  if
not  contrived.  rrUncerLainty  does play  a  role  in  the  analysis,
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but  only  uncertainty  with  respect  to  the  tining  of  paynents.rl
Second, brokerage  fees  on highly  narketable  financial  asseLs are
quite  1ow.  Treasury  bills  in  denominati.ons of  $10,000  can be
purchased  for  connissions  of  30 basis  points  (3/10  of  1 percent)
or  1ess.  In  a world  of  3-percent  interest  rates,  this  may have
been a  non-negl-ibl-e transaction  cost.  It  is  surely  neg1ib1e,
however,  in  a worLd of  double-digit  interest  rates.
Any plausibilty  this  approach had was lost  in  the  recent  era  of
high  interest  rates,  whieh  saw the  introduction  of  noney-rnarkeL
nutual  funds  and other  financial  innovations.  With  as  little  as
$1r000,  an individual  investor  can now place  idle  balances  at
interest  rates  only  slightly  below wholesale  rnoney-narket raE.es.
There  is  no bid-asked  spread  involved  in  going  in  and out  of  the
new noney-market  instruments.  And,  of  course,  one can writ.e
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checks  Eo draw on his  funds.  An approach  !ha!  at.tempted to
rationaLize  a  denand for  noney in  terns  of  c  h  a  r  a  c  t.  e  r  i s  t i c  s  of
noney markeLs was rendered  i.napplicable  by  innovations  in  these
markets.Theorists  have  recenEly  reasserted  the  paradox  of  a  demand for
n  o  n  i n  t.  e  r  e  s  t  - b  e  a  r i n  g  money.  They  deny  that  the  paradox  is  the
result  of  rnarket  forces,  but  argue  chat  it  is  the  effect  of  legal
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restrictions.  Neil  Wallace  seated  !he  case  forecfully:
Laissez-faire  means the  absence  of  1ega1  restrictions
thaL  tend,  anong  other  things,  to  enhance  the  demand
for  a  governmentrs  currency.  Thus,  the  imposition  of
laissez-faire  would  alnost  certainly  reduce  the  demand
for  government  currency.  It  could  even  reduce  it  to
zeto.  A  zero  denand  for  a  governnentrs  currency  should
be  interpreted  as  Ehe abandonment  of  one  monetary  unit
in  favor  of  another  --  for  exampLe,  the  abndonnnent  of
the  do11ar  1n  favor  of  one  ounce  of  go1d.  Thus,  ny
predicEion  of  Lhe  effects  of  imposing  laissez-faire
takes  the  form  of  an  either  or  statement:  either
noninal  interest  rates  go  Xo  zeto  or  exisLing
governnent  currency  becomes worthless.
I'Ia11ace dubbed  his  analysis  ttthe  1ega1  restrictions  theory"  of
the  demand for  money and  the  description  has  gained  acceptance.
According  to  the  t.heory,  there  would  be  no  demand for
n  o  n  i n  t e  r e  s  t - b  e  a  r i n  g  money  (e.g.,  currency  )  in  an  unregulaLed
(trlaissez-faire")  banking  system.  By  inplication,
i n  t e  r e  s  t - b  e  a  r i n  g  noney  woul-d be  indistinguishable  from  other
financial  assets.  Wallacers  intellectuaL  antecedenCs  were  ever
clearer  on  the  last  point.  For  instance,  Eischer  Black  firsc
identified  an  unregulated  financj.al  system  as  one  in  which
trcomrnercial  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  are  free  to
offer  checking  accoun!s  (  and  savings  accounts)  on  any  terrns  they
might  want  to  set,  and  in  which  there  are  no  reserve
requirements,rr  He  then  argued  that  in  such  a  world  ttit  would  not
be  possible  to  give  any  reasonable  definition  of  Lhe  quantity  of
t1noney.  The  paynenLs  nechanisn  in  such  a  world  would  be very
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tt  rn efficient,  buL none  y
place  of  money, Bl  ack
accounEs would  eme  r  ge
in  the  usual  sense  would  not  exist.
predicted  that  equity-based  cash-management
It  would  appear  that  one rnust choose between subscribing  to  a
contrived  market  analysi.s  or  accepting  the  bold  assertion  Lhat
the  demand  for  currency  is  the  result  of  tegal  restrictions.
There  is,  however,  a  !hlrd  choice,  which  i.s to  adopt  Menger's
theory  of  monetary  evolution.
A Mengerian  analysi.s  sharpl-y  distinguishes  between  money,  a
perfectLy  liquid  good,  and  highly  liquid,  nonmoney financial
assets.  Certain  historical  and  institutional  facts  nust  then
consi.dered.  First,  even  in  the  freesL  of  banking  systens
currency  has  not  ordinarily  borne  i.nterest.  Second,  in  the
United  States,  most  1ega1  restrictions  on  the  creation  of
financial  assets,  including  money,  are  of  cornparatively  recent
vintage.  Restrictions  on  the  payrnent  of  interest  rates  on  demand
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deposits  date  only  to  the  Banking  Act  of  1933.  The  restri.ctions
on  banksr  issuing  currency  date  only  to  t.he National  Bank  Act
(f863).  Even  so,  although  interest  was  fornerly  paid  on  some
demand-deposit  accounts  before  Lhe  rest.rictions,  currencv  did  not
generally  bear  interest.
The  period  of  free  banking  in  Scotland  most  closely
-22_approxj.rnates a  laissez-faire  banking  syslen.  ScoLtish  banks  did
not  pay interest  on their  bank notes  even though  there  \'tas  no
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prohibition  on their  doing  so.  In  his  recent  study  of  Scottish
free  banking,  tr'lhire  concl-uded that:  iCompetitive  free  banking  is
therefore  not  inconsistent  with  an absence of  i n  t e  r  e  s  t  -  b  e  a  r  i n  g
currency.  Notice  that  travelers  checks  today,  even though  they
are  paid  over  but  once and are  issued  conpetitively'  do not  bear
)z
in t eres  t .  It
Historical  experience  casts  doubt  on the  thesis  of  the  legal
restrictions  theory.  fn  theoretical  terns,  the  ttparadoxrr
suggested  by  the  lega1  restrictions  theory  is  at  issue.  Fron  a
Mengerian  perspective,  there  is  no paradox  in  the  fact  that  bonds
yield  interest  and money either  does not  or  else  yields  a  lower
rate  of  interest.  This  reflects  noneyts  superlor  liquidity'
superior  even to  the  nost  liquid,  short-tern  nonmoney  financial
assets.  As Menger emphasi.zed,  money is  not  just  highly  liquid
but  is  perfectly  liquid.  Bei.ng the  good that  circulates
routinely  as  the  medium  of  exchange'  money trades  in  every  narket
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and is  never  sold  at  a  discount  from  par.
Klein  characterized  Lhe distinction  in  the  following  way:  it  is
moneyrs nonDecuniarv  services  that  distinguish  it  from  nonmoney
financial  assets.  Tn other  r,tords, rnoney  yields  nonpecuniary
recurns  while  other  assets  yield  pecuniary  ret.urns.  Liquidity  is
-23-the  peculiar  nonpecuniary  return  yielded  by  rnoney.  Because rnoney
is  perfec!1y  liquid  and yi.elds  a  nonpecuniary  return,  it  will  not
also  yi.e1d a market  rate  of  interest.  If  rnoney  were both
perfectly  liquid  and yi.elded  an explicit  market  rate  of  interest,
then  its  total  return  wouLd be supra-norma1.  Cornpetitive  forces
would  drive  down its  explicit  yield  so  that  the  total  rate  of
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return  equaLed that  of  nonmoney  fLnancial  assets.
Kleinrs  analysis  is  certainly  consisLent  with  Mengerts
approach.  IL  is  a narket  analysis,  with  a  sound basis  in  both
nicro  theory  and institutional  features  of  financial  markets.
The approach  also  obviates  the  necessity  of  invoking  J.ega1
restrictj.ons,  which  are  of  recent  origin,  in  order  to  explain
patterns  of  return  that. have persisted  across  time  and differing
lnstitutions.
A School  Apart
Mark Blaug  once attributed  to  T.  W. Ilutchinson  the  clain  that
ttwhat was inportant  in  marginal  uti.lity  was the  adjective  rather
:)o
than  the  noun."  This  observation  is  decidedly  not  true  of
it
Mengerrs  work.  Utility  or  subjective  value  was  the  paramount
concept  in  Mengerrs  analysis.  His  analysis  was  subjectivist  both
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in  rnethodology and in  content.  The !heories  of  the  other
marginal"ists  certainly  contained  subjectivist  elements  bu!  nonewas as  thoroughgoing  in  its  subjectivism  as was Mengerrs.  Indeed,
the  enduring  contributi-on  of  the  Austrian  School  flows  from  its
subjectivism.  Streissler  best  sumrned  up the  situation  when he
obseryed  that  rrthe AusLri.ans always  stressed,  and stressed
rightly,  r  think,  that  they  were  the  school  of  subjective  values,
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a  school  apart. tr
Mengerts  mosE  enduring  legacy  to  rnonetafy econornics --  as  to
economics generall-y  --  was his  subjectivisrn.  Havlng  rejected  an
explanation  of  noney as  being  the  result  of  a centralized
decision,  Menger used his  individualistic  or  microeconornic method
to  develop  a  theoretical  soluti-on.  This  approach enabletl him  to
develop  an evolutionary  theory  of  money.  This  theory  is  less
weLl  known, however,  then  his  nethodological  writings.  In  this
paper,  I  have attempted  to  remedy the  situation.  I  have also
tried  to  Lndicate  the  contenporary  relevance  of  Mengerrs  theory
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of  nroney.
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